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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JACOB TYLER ANDERSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45264
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-8152

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jacob Anderson pled guilty to two counts of sexual exploitation of a child and the district
court sentenced him to concurrent terms of five years, with two years fixed. Mr. Anderson
asserts that, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case, the district court imposed an
excessive sentence.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Officers with the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force discovered that sexually
explicit photos and videos involving children were downloaded to a computer owned by Jacob
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Anderson.

(PSI, pp.117-18.)1

When contacted by the officers, Mr. Anderson admitted to

downloading the images and videos. (PSI, p.118.)
The State filed a criminal complaint charging Mr. Anderson with seven counts of sexual
exploitation of a child. (R., pp.7-10.) Mr. Anderson waived his right to a preliminary hearing,
was bound over into the district court, and an Information was filed charging him with those
crimes. (R., pp.19-22, 27-29.) Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Mr. Anderson pled
guilty to two counts of sexual exploitation of a child and agreed to participate in a psychosexual
evaluation; in exchange, the State agreed to recommend a total unified term of 20 years, with
three years fixed, and to dismiss the remaining charges. (R., pp.32-45; Tr., p.6, L.4 – p.20, L.4.)
During the sentencing hearing, the State asked the court to impose a total unified term of 20
years, with three years fixed (Tr., p.26, Ls.23-24), while Mr. Anderson’s counsel requested the
court impose probation, but did not recommend an underlying sentence (Tr., p.33, L.9 – p.35,
L.4).

The district court followed neither recommendation and instead imposed concurrent

unified terms of five years, with two years fixed, without placing Mr. Anderson on probation.
(R., pp.51-54; Tr., p.45, Ls.2-13.) Mr. Anderson filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 2 (R., pp.5557.)

1

Citations to the confidential exhibits will include the designation “PSI” and the page number
associated with the 255-page electronic file containing those documents.
2
Mr. Anderson also filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the court for leave to supplement the
motion with further supporting documentation. (R., p.58.) A review of the Register of Actions
for this case, as found through the iCourt Portal online record system, indicates that no further
action was taken on Mr. Anderson’s Rule 35 motion. In light of the relevant standards of review,
Mr. Anderson does not raise any issues related to his Rule 35 motion in this appeal.
2

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon Mr. Anderson,
in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence Upon
Mr. Anderson, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
Mr. Anderson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of five years,
with two years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record considering the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Anderson does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory

maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Anderson must show that
in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.
Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136
Idaho 138 (2001)).
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Jacob Anderson was 37 years-old when he was charged with these crimes, his first
criminal charges of any kind, admitting that he had been viewing child pornography for the prior
five to six years. (PSI, pp.117-19.) Born without fully formed arms and legs, Mr. Anderson is
confined to a wheelchair. (PSI, pp.75, 121; Tr., p.34, Ls.13-19.) Growing up, he had the love
and support of his mother and his two brothers, but he was emotionally abused by his father, who
divorced his mother when Mr. Anderson was 9 years old. (PSI, pp.119-20.) At times growing
up, Mr. Anderson thrived, doing well in school and enjoying activities with friends and family;
however, being teased by other children took its toll and Mr. Anderson faced bouts of
depression. (PSI, p.253.)
Despite his physical limitations, Mr. Anderson graduated from high school and spent
some time in college, and moved out of his family home and worked at Clearwater Research for
a period of 7 years. (PSI, pp.120-22; 253-55.) Unfortunately, Mr. Anderson began abusing
alcohol in his early 30s to the point that his mother and brothers were worried they would go to
his apartment one day and find him dead. (PSI, p.254.) It was during this period of time
Mr. Anderson began viewing child pornography. (PSI, p.118.)
As recognized by the prosecutor, Mr. Anderson was forthcoming and cooperative during
the investigation, and Mr. Anderson participated in a Psychosexual Evaluation conducted by the
State’s chosen expert, Dr. Michael Johnston. (PSI, pp.72-115; Tr., p.7, L.25 – p.8, L.6; p.28,
Ls.9-14.) Dr. Johnston concluded that Mr. Anderson was a low risk to re-offend and that he was
as amenable to treatment as most sex-offenders, and Mr. Anderson himself expressed a desire to
get treatment. (PSI, pp.72-73, 125.) Furthermore, Mr. Anderson’s mother, Evelyn Mason, wrote
a letter in support expressing her desire to see that her son get the treatment that he needs, and
noting that he will be prepared to face the “public scrutiny and judgmental questions” associated
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with being a registered sex-offender, because he has faced that same type of scrutiny all of his
life due to his physical limitations. (PSI, pp.253-55.)
Finally, Mr. Anderson addressed the district court at sentencing stating that he knows
what he did was “absolutely terrible. I can’t forgive myself for what I’ve done,” and that he
wants to get as much help as possible because he does not want to “have this interest any
longer[.]” (Tr., p.35, Ls.11-24.) Idaho Courts recognize that a lack of criminal history, alcohol
use, acceptance of responsibility, remorse, the willingness and amenability for treatment, and the
support of family, are all mitigating factors that should counsel a court to impose a less severe
sentence. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593 (1982); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982); State
v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293 (1997); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991).
Mr. Anderson asserts that, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case, the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests this Court to remand his case to the district court with
instructions to place Mr. Anderson on probation, or to otherwise reduce his sentence, as this
Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 18th day of December, 2017.

___________/s/______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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